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INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, heightened the focus
on protecting the United States from acts of terrorism.' Despite this

heightened focus, the nation remains a vulnerable target for those
t A.B., Princeton University, 2001; candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, 2007.
Thanks to Professors Steven Clymer and Trevor Morrison for their very helpful comments
and suggestions. Thanks to Jonathan C. Rothberg, Alison S. Fraser, Laura C. Klimpel, and
Ulysses S. Smith for their terrific editing skills and thoughtful comments. Thanks also to In
Ku Lee for helping me pursue this topic. I would also like to thank my friends who have
made my experience at Cornell Law School so much fun. Most of all, I would like to thank
my family for their constant love and support.
1
See NAT'L COM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 361 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] ("Countering terrorism has become, beyond any doubt, the top national security priority for the United States.").
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who wish to do it harm. 2 One of the more attractive targets-due in
no small part to the difficulty of fully protecting it-is the nation's
transportation system. 3 The nation's large investment in securing its
transportation infrastructure highlights the system's great importance
as well as its continuing vulnerability. 4 Though the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, showed how the commercial transportation system may be used as the target of or the weapon for a direct attack, 5 it
may also be used as a conduit for weapons parts or dangerous chemicals intended to be used against civilians in a future attack. 6 Moreo2 See id. at 383-85, 390-92 ("[A]lthough Americans maybe safer, they are not safe.");
Transportation Security R&D, GAO 04-890, TSA and DHS Are Researching and Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management 7 (Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.gaogov/new.items/d04890.pdf ("The size of the [U.S.] transportation system,
which moves millions of passengers and tons of freight every day, makes it both an attractive target for terrorists and difficult to secure."); Stephen E. Flynn, The Neglected Home
Front, FOREIGN ArVns, September/October 2004, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.
org/20040901faessay83504/stephen-e-flynn/the-neglected-home-front.html
("The transportation, energy, information, financial, chemical, food, and logistical networks that underpin U.S. economic power and the American way of life offer the United States' enemies
a rich menu of irresistible targets. And most of these remain virtually unprotected.").
3 See, e.g., Public TransportationSecurity: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Highways, Transit
& Pipelines of the H. Comm. on Transportationand Infrastructure,108th Cong. 2 (2004), available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/highway/06-22-04/108-75.pdf
(noting the
unique vulnerability of public transportation systems). Though aviation transportation is a
terrorist target for different reasons than surface transportation and presents unique security concerns, both types of transportation within the United States are vulnerable. Compare
Press Release, H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, Bill Requiring Missile Defense Protections for Airbus A380 Aircraft Introduced in Congress (June 15, 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/transportation/press/press2005/release76.html
("[W]e know that
terrorists continue to consider commercial aviation an attractive target because of the public spectacle such attacks generate and because the world economy is increasingly dependent upon aviation."), with Beth Dickey, Safe Passage,GOv'T EXECUTIVE, March 15, 2005,
available at http://www.govexec.com/features/0305-15/0305-15s3.htm ("Compared with
aviation, surface transportation offers easier access to more users, making it both an attractive target and difficult to protect."). The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the continued threats to aviation security may have led to more government involvement in securing
the airways, but the constitutional rights of American citizens are not contingent on the
mode of transportation they choose. However, both the unique risks posed by aviation
security and the fact that the U.S. aviation system has already been targeted inform the
approach a court might take in seeking to balance security with individual rights. See infra
Part III.D.
4 See Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS Receives $2.4 Billion Increase for
2006 Appropriations (Oct. 18, 2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?
content=4894 ("The Appropriations Act provides a total of $5.9 billion for the Transportation Security Administration, including $443 million for explosive detection technology.").
5 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 31 (observing that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, involved the "transformation of commercial aircraft into
weapons of mass destruction").
6 See id. at 177 (noting that a would-be terrorist successfully transported "precursor
chemicals for explosives disguised in toiletry bottles" onboard a plane). The failed August
2006 terrorist plot to use liquid explosives to blow up U.S.-bound passengerjets went a step
further, with terrorists seeking to mix seemingly innocuous precursor chemicals and components to create deadly explosives while the planes were in the air. SeeJohn Ward Ander-
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ver, while concerns over possible terrorist attacks now predominate, 7
drug dealers continue to rely on the commercial transportation system to move their product throughout the country.8
Recognizing the heightened threat of terrorism and the persistence of drug trafficking, government and private actors in the transportation industry have continued to alter the way they operate,
especially concerning security protocols. 9 Despite more aggressive law
enforcement tactics, 10 Americans still largely retain their civil liberties
in the face of such threats. It Of course, the difficult question is where
to strike the balance between protecting citizens and protecting their
civil liberties.' 2 Though citizens want to allow law enforcement to effectively prevent illegal activity-especially dangerous terrorist activson & Karen DeYoung, Plot to Bomb U.S.-BoundJet Is Foiled, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2006, at
A01 (describing the plot in detail).
7 See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1.
8 Much of the drug trafficking takes place on the nation's highways, waterways, and
border crossings, but the commercial transportation system is still widely used by drug
traffickers. See U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., DEA Briefs & Background: Drug Trafficking
in the United States, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/drug-trafficking.html (last visited
Sept. 6, 2006). While the threat of illegal drug trafficking may not arouse the fears of the
American people as much as potential terrorist attacks, the drug trade continues to endanger American communities. See OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, DRUG-RELATED

CRIME (2000), http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/ncj181056.pdf
(describing the strong relationship between the use and sale of illegal drugs and other
crimes).
9 See Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.
597 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.A.); 49 U.S.C. § 44901 (2000);
Transit and Over-the-Road Bus Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Highways, Transit and
Pipelines of the H. Comm. on Transportationand Infrastructure,109th Cong. (2006) (statement
of PeterJ. Pantuso, President and Chief Executive Officer, American Bus Association) (discussing the American Bus Association's efforts over the last five years to improve security
and highlighting the continued need to fund future security initiatives); Local Law Enforcement Agencies Ramp Up Security (CNN television broadcast May 20, 2003), transcriptavailable
at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0305/20/bn.07.html (describing how
upon an increase in the terrorist alert level, the Bush Administration asked state and local
officials to be more vigilant in defending against terrorist threats); see also Jeremy R.
Jehangiri, Student Article, United States v. Drayton: Attention Passengers,All Carry-On Baggage and ConstitutionalProtections Are Checked in the Terminal, 48 S.D. L. REv. 104, 129 (noting
that Greyhound responded to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, by instituting
security measures such as increased screening, and by seeking additional federal
assistance).
10 See, e.g., Sewell Chan & Kareem Fahim, New York Starts to Inspect Bags on the Subways,
N.Y. TIMEs,July 22, 2005, at Al (describing a new police policy to randomly check commuters' bags on the New York City subway system).
I I See, e.g., James X. Dempsey, Civil Liberties in a Time of Crisis, HUMAN RIGHTS, Winter
2002, at 8.
12 See, e.g., Angie Cannon, Taking Liberties, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 12, 2003, at
44, 45 ("Every week seems to bring fresh examples of the shifting balance between fighting
terrorism and upholding personal freedoms."); Richard A. Posner, Security Versus Civil Liberties, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2001, at 46 (arguing that the rights conferred by the Bill of
Rights are "alterable in response to changing threats to national security").
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ity' 3-this nation was founded upon the principle that constitutional
rights should not be violated or abused in that pursuit. 14 The tension
between these principles is particularly apparent in the tenuous relationship between law enforcement's goal of protecting citizens and
the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and
5

seizures.1

While it is impossible to eliminate this natural tension, clear rules
and definitions relating to searches and seizures better protect constitutional rights and ensure judicial oversight to prevent overreaching
by law enforcement. 16 Standards employed by courts should be flexible enough to accommodate the different situations that may arise.
However, to reduce the opportunity for abuse, such standards should
17
be clear enough for principled and consistent application.
In the seizure context, which is the focus of this Note, clear standards are crucial for protecting civil liberties because absent a court's
determination that a government agent has, in fact, seized property,
Fourth Amendment protections are not triggered and any reasonableness analysis is moot. i8 Yet courts have still not developed a clear standard for determining when a temporary relinquishing of personal
property to a common carrier while traveling through the United
13 See, e.g., Chan & Fahim, supra note 10 (noting the connection between visible antiterrorism measures and the general public's confidence in their safety).
14
Benjamin Franklin expressed the importance of this debate when he uttered the
following famous words: "Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little
temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the
Governor (November 11, 1755), in 6 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 242 (Leonard W.
Labaree ed., 1963).
15
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Daniel W. Sutherland, Homeland Security and Civil Liberties: Protecting America's Way of Life, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 289, 302
(2005) (acknowledging that "[i]t is natural for some to think that ... the threats are so
substantial that America needs to set aside or compromise certain principles," but concluding that "we must go back to our roots and redouble our commitment to the Constitution,
to the Bill of Rights, and to our freedoms"). The author recognizes that "one of the greatest challenges brought on by the war on terror is to ensure that, while we increasingly
secure our nation from terrorist attack, we also preserve America's way of life." Id.
16
See United States v. Va Lerie, 385 F.3d 1141, 1155 (8th Cir. 2004) (Riley, J., dissenting) ("It is absolutely critical that citizens and law enforcement understand what the
Fourth Amendment protects."), rev'd en banc, 424 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126
S.Ct. 2966 (2006). The denial of a writ of certiorari in this case, and indeed any case, does
not give any indication as to how the Supreme Court views the lower court's decision. See
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 85 (1995) ("Of course, '[t] he denial of a writ of certiorari
imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case, as the bar has been told
many times.'" (quoting United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923))).
17
See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 701 ("[W]e recognize a principled interpretation, and consistent application, of the Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment . . . is vital to the
protection of civil liberties and also to law enforcement's ability to conduct itself in a constitutional manner. . .).
18 See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1985) ("Absent some action taken by
government agents that can properly be classified as a 'search' or a 'seizure,' the Fourth
Amendment rules... do not apply."); United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
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States constitutes a seizure. 1 9 Recently, the Eighth Circuit sought to
lay out a clear and consistent definition of seizure in the travel context.20 However, the majority's decision only further confused the
question of when the detainment of checked baggage is a Fourth
Amendment seizure and, therefore, when reasonableness analysis
applies.
Part I of this Note discusses the historical and judicial importance
of the Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment as well as the limited
Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning personal property checked
with a common carrier. Part II discusses the background of United
States v. Va Lerie2 l as well as the legal reasoning behind the majority
and dissenting opinions in that case. Part III evaluates the majority's
opinion in Va Lerie and concludes that it contravenes Supreme Court
precedent. Part III further argues that the Va Lerie majority failed to
achieve its stated goal of bringing clarity to the definition of seizure as
it relates to travelers' checked baggage. Instead, it established a test
that is not only inconsistent with the Supreme Court's approach, but
also impossible to apply in a rational and predictable manner. Finally,
Part III offers a more workable approach that both comports with Supreme Court precedent and draws the clearer line that is necessary to
protect citizens' civil liberties.
I
CHECKED BAGGAGE SEIzUREs: LIMITED SUPREME

COURT JURISPRUDENCE FOR A CRUCIAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

The Founding Fathers viewed the Bill of Rights, including the
Fourth Amendment, 22 as a critical tool in protecting citizens from an
overzealous government. 23 In accordance with this view, the Supreme
Court has in the past affirmed the variety of fundamental interests
19 See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 700 ("It can be argued our court has not spoken with a
consistent voice when considering what constitutes a seizure in cases involving law enforcement's interference with luggage .
20 See supra note 17.
21
See 424 F.3d at 696-700.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23 See, e.g., Statement of Alexander Hamilton from Debate at the New York Ratifying
Convention (June 25, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION

AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 303 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) ("Good constitutions
are formed upon a comparison of the liberty of the individual with the strength of govern-

ment .... ); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 297-300 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland et al. eds.,
1977) ("Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of
oppression.").
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implicated by unreasonable searches and seizures. 24 Yet, in response
to terrorist threats, there is a tendency to narrow the protections afforded by constitutional rights. 25 Now, because of law enforcement's
broadened responsibilities in combating terrorist threats2 6 and government agents' more aggressive identification of baggage as suspicious, 2 7 the issue of protection from unreasonable seizures frequently
arises when travelers' personal property is detained as they navigate
28
the U.S. transportation system.
Observing the greater threat to national security and the vulnerability of the transportation system to a terrorist attack after September
11, 2001,29 the federal government increased transportation security
and passed legislation to federalize airline security. 30 Throughout the
U.S. transportation system, not just on airplanes, 31 government agents
detain carry-on baggage, checked baggage, and mailed packages that
the agents deem suspicious, and subject them to inspection.3 2 Because Fourth Amendment protections apply only when a "seizure" has
occurred,3 defining the term too narrowly would allow law enforcement to unreasonably detain checked baggage in violation of civil liberties, as Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis would not even
24 See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984) (noting that seizures impact
possessory interests and searches impact privacy interests); United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 113 (1984); William C. Heffernan, Property, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 60
BROOK. L. REv. 633, 643 (1994) (commenting on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
25
See Posner, supra note 12. See generally Sutherland, supra note 15.
26 See Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Customs Service Inspectors Make Large Cocaine, Marijuana Seizures Over Holiday Weekend Uan. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/press_releases/archives/cbp_
press releases/012003/01212003.xml ("The sharp increase in drug seizures is directly related to the recent anti-terrorism training our officers have undergone.").
27 See, e.g., Dep't of Homeland Sec., Travel & Transportation: Protecting Travelers
and Commerce, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/themehome3.jsp (last visited Sept. 6,
2006) (discussing the consolidation of several federal agencies into the Department of
Homeland Security to increase safety at entry and travel points in the United States);
Transp. Sec. Agency, Security & Law Enforcement: Canine & Explosives Program, http://
www.tsa.gov/public/display?theme=32 (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) ("[The program] exists
to deter and detect the introduction of explosive devices into the transportation system.").
28 See United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 703 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Seizure issues
involving checked luggage are hardly new for circuit courts."), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2966
(2006).
29 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1; Posner, supra note 12, at 46 ("[Ijt appears ... that the events of September 11 have revealed the United States to be in much
greater jeopardy from international terrorism than had previously been believed .. ").
30 See Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.
597 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.A.).
31
See, e.g., Jehangiri, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
32 Some of the inspections occur after a government agent has received the owner's
consent. See David S. Rudstein, "Touchy " "Feely "-Is there a ConstitutionalDifference? The Constitutionality of "Prepping"a Passenger's Luggage for a Human or Canine Snff after Bond v.
United States, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 191, 200-14 (2001) (discussing the "poofing" or "prepping" of a passenger's luggage).
33 See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1985).
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be implicated. 34 Despite its importance, the Supreme Court has only
rarely addressed the issue of what constitutes a seizure of individuals'
35
personal property in the travel context.

In United States v. Jacobsen, the Supreme Court first addressed the
definition of a seizure of property in the commercial transportation
context when it looked at the detainment of a package mailed
through a private freight carrier.3 6 The Court found that a seizure
had occurred when government agents, whom Federal Express employees had summoned to the Federal Express office to inspect a
package containing a suspicious white powder, participated in a fur37
ther detainment of the package for their own investigative purposes.
In an opinion that Justice John Paul Stevens authored, the Court
made a general statement that a seizure of property "occurs when
there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interests in that property. '38 In concluding that a seizure had occurred, the Court stated that "the decision by governmental authorities to exert dominion and control over the package for their own purposes
clearly constituted a 'seizure. 39 While the Court stated that property is
seized when there is a "meaningful interference" with an individual's
possessory interest in it,40 the Court went on to ask only whether the
government agents had exerted "dominion and control" over the defendant's property to determine if they had seized it,4 1 thus indicating
that proof of dominion and control over property may establish meaningful interference with a possessory interest in it.42 The Court also
34 See United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 136-37 (1984) (Brennan,J., dissenting)
("[A]n investigative technique that falls within neither category need not be reasonable
and may be employed without a warrant and without probable cause, regardless of the
circumstances surrounding its use."); Rudstein, supra note 32.
'5
See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 n.5 ("[T]he concept of a 'seizure' of property is not
much discussed in our cases.").
36 See id. at 111.
37 See id. at 111, 119.
38
Id. at 113. The Court noted that this definition tracked its definition for seizures of
persons, see id. at 114 n.5, but seemed to do so to explain the origin of the definition rather
than to indicate that the possessory interest involved in seizures of property should relate
to an individual's freedom of movement. See id. at 113 & n.5 ("While the concept of a
'seizure' of property is not much discussed in our cases, this definition follows from our
oft-repeated definition of the 'seizure' of a person within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment-meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual's freedom of
movement.").
39
Id. at 120 n.18 (emphasis added); see United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 730
(1984) (stating that asserting dominion and control over property occurs when one has
the power to use such property for one's own purposes); see also Walter v. United States,

447 U.S. 649 (1980) (ruling that even when federal agents only inspected packages after
they were opened by a private third party, a seizure had taken place).
40 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
41
Id. at 120-21.
42 See id. at 120 n.18.
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focused on who had custody of the package and the purpose of the
44
seizure, 4 3 rather than any expectation of timely delivery.
Following Jacobsen, the Court refined its approach to the seizure
of property by distinguishing between interests in personal belongings
held in one's possession and in those checked with a common carrier. 45 In United States v. Place,46 the Court found that the temporary
investigative detention of a traveler's luggage that was in his "immediate possession" constituted a seizure. 47 However, the Court also stated
that such a seizure "intrudes on both the suspect's possessory interest in
his luggage as well as his liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary."' 48 This language, in conjunction with Jacobsen's holding that dominion and control create a meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interest, implies that travelers have possessory
interests in their personal belongings, whether they have them on
49
their persons, check them with third-party carriers, or mail them.
Additionally, while travelers' expectations about how carriers
handle their belongings differ from their privacy concerns in the
search context, 50 such expectations do interact with dominion and
5
control to inform the seizure analysis. 1
Viewing the constitutional interest in property seized during
transportation that the Court addressed in both Jacobsen and Place, a
consistent approach to the definition of a seizure of personal belongings in the travel context emerges. This clear approach should lead to
uniform application in the lower courts. However, a recent Eighth
Circuit case that directly addressed this issue not only setfled on a
standard that lacks clarity, but also applied that standard in a way that
52
contradicts Supreme Court jurisprudence on the matter.
See id. at 119.
See id. at 120-21 & n.18.
45
See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (affirming the Second Circuit's ruling that detaining the bags of a traveler that were in his possession violated the Fourth
Amendment).
46
Id.
See id. at 708.
47
43
44

Id. (emphasis added).
See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992) (stating that the Court's cases
"unmistakably hold that the [Fourth] Amendment protects property as well as privacy");
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (discussing the possessory interest in property).
50
Cf Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (finding an officer's physical manipulation of a bus passenger's bag stored in an overhead compartment constituted a search
because it exceeded the passenger's expectations as to how his belongings would be handled). The Bond Court determined that the passenger's expectation was that the bus company or a fellow passenger might handle his luggage, but not in an exploratory manner.
See id.
51
See infra Part III.B.1.
52
See United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 701 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
2966 (2006).
48
49
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II
CASE DISCUSSION: UNITED STATES V. VA LERIE

On December 23, 2002, Keith Va Lerie paid cash for a one-way
Greyhound bus ticket and boarded in Los Angeles en route to Washington, D.C. 53 Va Lerie had checked a garment bag, which was placed
in a luggage compartment underneath the bus.5 4 At a refueling stop

in Omaha, Nebraska, the bus passengers disembarked before the bus
proceeded to the refueling area pursuant to Greyhound safety policy.5 5 While the bus was in the refueling area, Investigator Alan Eberle
of the Nebraska State Patrol (NSP), who performed regular duties for
the NSP and watched for people transporting illegal items to the East
Coast, looked into the lower compartment and noticed Va Lerie's

"newer" garment bag, 56 which had a luggage ticket on it but no hand-

written nametag. 57 After further investigation revealed that Va Lerie
had paid cash for his one-way ticket, 58 Eberle "had the bag removed
from the bus and brought into the rear baggage terminal by NSP investigators. ' 59 Eberle then paged Va Lerie and brought him into the
office, where the officers obtained Va Lerie's consent to search the
bag. 60 In the subsequent search, the officers found five sealed bags
61
containing cocaine.
For the purposes of this Note, the important question is whether
a seizure of Va Lerie's bag had occurred when law enforcement removed the bag from the bus and brought it inside the baggage terminal. After his arrest and indictment, Va Lerie filed a motion to
suppress the cocaine as evidence obtained from an unreasonable
seizure, 62 but the magistrate judge, while conceding that a seizure had
53

See United States v. Va Lerie, No. 8:03-CR-23, 2003 WL 21953948, at *1 (D. Neb.),

rev'd, No. 8:03-CR-23, 2003 WL 21956437 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2003), rev'd en banc, 424 F.3d
694 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2966 (2006).
54 See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 696.
55
See Va Lerie, 2003 WL 21953948, at *1 (stating that Greyhound's policy for having
passengers deboard the bus before fueling resulted from a desire to avoid "an excess of
people in the refueling area").
56
Id.
57
58

Id.
After becoming suspicious of the garment bag, Eberle ran a computer check of the

bag's luggage ticket and found that the bag's owner, using the name "Valerie Keith," had
paid $164 in cash for a one-way ticket. See United States v. Va Lerie, 385 F.3d 1141,

1143-44 (8th Cir. 2004), rev'd en banc, 424 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
2966 (2006).
59
Va Lerie, 2003 WL 21956437, at *1.
60 Va Lerie, 385 F.3d at 1144. The defendant argued that he did not validly consent to
the search of his bag. Va Lerie, 2003 WL 21956437, at *1.
61
Va Lerie, 385 F.3d at 1144.
62 Va Lerie, 2003 WL 21953948, at *1.
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occurred,63 recommended rejecting the motion 64 because the seizure
had not been unreasonable. 65 Va Lerie was then indicted in the
United States District Court for the District of Nebraska 66 for possession with intent to distribute five hundred grams or more of a mixture
containing cocaine. 67 The district court heard the evidence upon the
68
parties' objections and granted the defendant's motion to suppress,
holding that the NSP had seized the garment bag without reasonable
suspicion. 69 The court invoked the language of Jacobsen, noting that
when the officers removed the bag from the bus and brought it to a
room inside the station, the officers had "substantially interfered with
' 70
the defendant's possessory interest in the bag.
On appeal, the case moved to a three-member panel of the
Eighth Circuit, which reconsidered the issue of whether a seizure had
occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 7' Before
the panel, the government argued that although the NSP removed Va
Lerie's bag from the Greyhound bus, Greyhound continued to retain

63 Id. at *2 ("Va Lerie seeks to suppress evidence taken during the seizure and search
of the garment bag. ..."). In fact, the magistrate judge did not even suggest that there was
a question as to whether a seizure occurred. See id.at *1.
64

65

Id. at *6.

Id. at *3 ("The removal of the bag to the rear baggage area of the terminal was not
unreasonable."). If the seizure of the bag were deemed unreasonable, the evidence would
have been suppressed. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) ("Evidence
obtained as a direct result of an unconstitutional search or seizure is plainly subject to
exclusion.").
66 Va Lerie, 2003 WL 21956437. Judge Bataillon noted the magistrate judge's "detailed and accurate" statements regarding the events. See id.at *1.
67 United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
2966 (2006). Va Lerie was charged with a drug possession violation. See 21 U.S.C.
§§ 849(a)(1), (b)(1) (2000).
68
Va Lerie, 2003 WL 21956437, at *9.
69 Id. at *2 ("Based on the facts before me, I can only conclude .. . that a seizure
occurred when the officers removed the defendant's garment bag from the bus and took it
inside the terminal."). Once a detainment is deemed a seizure, it must be reasonable,
meaning it was justified by probable cause or, in some cases, reasonable suspicion. See
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (discussing the different procedures and
standards for reasonable and unreasonable detainments); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20-23 (1968) (stating that warrantless seizure of luggage or packages requires "specific and
articulable facts, which ... reasonably warrant that intrusion"). For the purposes of this
Note, it is only necessary to understand that without initially finding a seizure, the reasonableness analysis is not implicated.
70
Va Lerie, 2003 WL 21956437, at *4; see United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1984) ("A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with
an individual's possessory interests in that property.").
71
United States v. Va Lerie, 385 F.3d 1141, 1145 (8th Cir. 2004), rev'd en banc, 424
F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2966 (2006). The court also reviewed for
clear error the factual findings relating to the defendant's consent to search. See id.at
1145-46.
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custody of it.72 However, the divided panel 73 found that while bus
passengers might expect carriers to handle their bags to some extent
en route to their destinations,7 4 Eberle had seized Va Lerie's bag
when he "had the bag removed from the bus" and taken inside to be
searched.7 5 Invoking the language of Jacobsen, the court noted that a
seizure occurs when officials exert "dominion and control" over an
item7 6 beyond a "superficial inspection.

'77

The court also declared

that a detention "for the purpose of seeking consent to search" is a
detainment to pursue investigative measures, which goes beyond the
reasonable expectations of someone with a possessory interest in that
78
item.
In a noteworthy concurring opinion, Judge Michael J. Melloy
claimed that while the court had correctly analyzed the case under its
own "precedent dealing with the definition of a seizure,"7 9 such precedent "is of questionable validity."8 0 Judge Melloy urged the court to
"re-visit the issue"8' and further emphasized the time element of a
seizure,8 2 arguing that the court must consider the "temporal element
83
of the inspection" more than it had in the past.
72

Id. at 1146 (stating that Eberle testified to the effect that when a bag was removed

in this way "the bag nevertheless remained in Greyhound's custody and the officers were
merely taking care of it").
73 Id. at 1141 (2-1 decision).
74

Id. at

1148.

75 Id. On appeal, the government did not argue that ajustified seizure had occurred,
but instead challenged the district court's holding that a seizure had occurred at all. See id.
at 1150 (Melloy,J., concurring) ("The government made the tactical decision to challenge
the district court decision solely on the grounds that the district court was wrong in its
ruling that a seizure occurred."). Without having to review the determination that the
seizure was unreasonable, the court's finding of a Fourth Amendment seizure instantly
resolved the case against the government. See id. However, if the court had not found a
seizure, the unreasonableness of the detainment would have been irrelevant. See supra
note 18.
76 Id. at 1147 (quoting United States v. Gomez, 312 F.3d 920,924 n.2 (8th Cir. 2002)).
77 Id.; see also Gomez, 312 F.3d at 924 n.2 (stating that a seizure occurs when officers
have "exerted dominion and control" over a package by deciding to "go beyond superficial
inspection of the exterior of the package[ ]" and detain it for further inquiry into characteristics that are not observable just by holding it) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 120 n.18 (1984)).
78
Va Lerie, 385 F.3d at 1147 (emphasis added) (stating that a bus passenger with
luggage in a common compartment does not "reasonably expect" that his luggage will be
physically removed without his knowledge and detained for a consent to search).
79 Id. at 1150 (Melloy, J., concurring).
80 Id. Judge Melloy argued that in past decisions the court had placed "undue emphasis" on whether there was more than a "superficial review" of the package or whether it
was moved to a different room, thus implying the risk of a similarly incorrect analysis in Va
Lerie. See id.
81 Id. at 1151.
82

Id.

83 Id. at 1150 (stating that "[p1 roper analysis requires consideration of the temporal
element of the inspection" and that "a brief detention of a piece of luggage that does not
result in the delay of either the passenger, or ultimate delivery of the luggage, is not a
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Interestingly, Judge William Jay Riley dissented8 4 but essentially
made the same argument as Judge Melloy, 8 5 urging the court to re-

consider its approach to what constitutes a seizure "'in the context of
a temporary removal and inspection of packages and luggage that
have been sent or checked with common carriers.' "86 Like Judge Melloy, Judge Riley noted the Eighth Circuit's muddled precedent on this
issue.8 7 However, Judge Riley would not have found a seizure in Va
Lerie's case, concluding that the Fourth Amendment "does not
frown" on such handling by officers because, as a traveler, Va Lerie
would have reasonably expected it, and because the handling did not
88
delay Va Lerie or interfere with the timely delivery of his baggage.
Moreover, Judge Riley would have found that there was no seizure
because the NSP officers removed the checked bag at Greyhound's
request, handled it in a manner consistent with Va Lerie's expectations, and never took custody of it.89
Heeding the suggestions of Judges Melloy and Riley, the Eighth
Circuit vacated the panel's decision, granted a rehearing en banc to
reconsider the seizure definition, and ultimately reversed the district
court's finding that a seizure had occurred. 90 Now writing for the majority, Judge Riley, while acknowledging that the court may not have
in the past "spoken with a consistent voice" regarding its seizure definition, 91 emphasized the importance of "principled interpretation[ ]
92
and consistent application[ ] of the Seizure Clause."
The majority then sought to apply the Supreme Court's definition of seizure in Jacobsen "with an eye toward .

.

. applications pro-

vided by [other circuits]," particularly the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits. 9 3 The majority noted that in United States v. Lovell,9 4 the Fifth
seizure" (emphasis added)). But cf United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 n.5 (1984)
(stating that the definition of a seizure of property follows from the definition of a seizure
of the person, which is "meaningful interference, however brief with an individual's freedom
of movement" (emphasis added)).
84
Va Lerie, 385 F.3d at 1151 (Riley, J., dissenting).
85
See id. at 1151 (arguing that there is no seizure "if the removal of the luggage does
not delay the passenger's travel, affect the timely delivery of the checked luggage, or interfere with the carrier's normal processing of the checked luggage").
86
Id. (quoting id. at 1151 (Melloy,J., concurring)).
87
See id. at 1155 (Riley,J., dissenting) ("If anything is clear, it is that our seizure cases
involving checked luggage and mailed packages are not."). Judge Riley also noted that the
Eighth Circuit's "decisions in the Fourth Amendment seizure area do not clearly enunciate
and faithfully apply a consistent standard." Id.
88 See id. at 1156.
89
See id. at 1156-57.
90
See United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
2966 (2006).
91 Id. at 700.
92
Id. at 700-02.
93
Id. at 706.
94
849 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1988).
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Circuit focused on the defendant airline passenger's freedom of
movement and his expectation of timely delivery of his checked luggage in determining whether a seizure had occurred. 95 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that with regard to the handling of his luggage, the
passenger expected the airline to "transport the bags to [his] destination for him to reclaim when he arrived." 6 It concluded that a "momentary delay" in removing the bags from the conveyor belt did not
constitute a meaningful interference with possessory interests, 97 because if drugs had not been found, the passenger's travel would not
"have been interfered with or his [reasonable] expectations with respect to his luggage frustrated."9 8
The Va Lerie majority also considered United States v. Ward,99 a
Seventh Circuit case that involved a defendant who had checked his
baggage with Greyhound but did not get on the bus. 10 0 In Ward, law
enforcement agents removed the defendant's checked baggage from
the bus's lower compartment at a meal stop. 10 ' Here, although the
defendant did not accompany his bag on the trip, the Seventh Circuit
addressed the possessory interest the defendant had in his checked
baggage by noting that he had "no cognizable interest in repossessing
his bag until his bus arrived" at its destination. 10 2 The Seventh Circuit
in Ward also stated that the defendant had no reasonable expectation
that Greyhound employees performing their duties and other passengers would not handle or remove his bag throughout the trip.10 3 Because the detainment in Ward did not interrupt the bag's transport or
interfere with the defendant's "contractually-based expectation" that
95 See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 703. In Lovell, border patrol agents removed a passenger's
checked baggage from the conveyor belt and smelled marijuana when they compressed
the sides several times, resulting in a police dog indicating the presence of the drug. 849
F.2d at 911. The Fifth Circuit also distinguished the case from Place, noting that the passenger in Lovell had surrendered his bags to a third-party common carrier. Id. at 916; see
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705 (1983) (noting that different interests are involved when bags in a traveler's immediate possession are detained than when those surrendered to a third party are detained).
96 - Lovel, 849 F.2d at 916.
97 See id.
98 Id. While agents clearly interfered with the defendant's travel after they discovered
drugs, the seizure analysis applies only to the events before the dog sniff alerted agents to
the presence of illicit drugs in defendant's bag, which provided the requisite probable
cause. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981) (noting that every arrest
and seizure is unreasonable unless supported by probable cause).
99 See Va lerie, 424 F.3d at 705.
100 United States v. Ward, 144 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 1988).
101
See id. at 1027-28. The defendant paid for his ticket in Los Angeles, checked his
luggage, and then flew to Indianapolis and waited for the bus's arrival so that he could
retrieve his luggage, which contained a kilogram of cocaine and a semiautomatic handgun,
a common practice for drug couriers. See id. at 1027-28, 1034 (stating that it was a typical
practice of drug couriers to send unaccompanied bags by bus).
102 Id. at 1031.
103 See id. at 1032-33.
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he would regain possession of the bag at its destination, the Seventh
10 4
Circuit held that the detention did not constitute a seizure.
The Va Lerie majority also noted the Ninth Circuit's adoption of
the Fifth Circuit's approach in United States v. Brown.10 5 In Brown,' 0 6
law enforcement agents detained an airline passenger's checked luggage in the cargo hold area of an airport terminal.'0 7 The Ninth Circuit in Brown used similar language to that of the Fifth Circuit and
observed that the length of the delay was important in determining
whether a seizure had occurred, explaining that the "brief detention"
of the defendant's bags "in no way interfered with his travel or frus10
trated his expectations with respect to his luggage."'

8

The Va Lerie majority also discussed United States v. Johnson,10 9 another Ninth Circuit case in which an airline planned to transport an
airline passenger's checked luggage on a flight leaving two hours later
than the passenger's flight because of his late arrival at the terminal.10 Although Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents
went onto the tarmac and took the luggage back to a DEA office to
1 12
subject it to a dog sniff, 1 ' which indicated the presence of drugs,
the Ninth Circuit observed that because airline representatives had
acquiesced, the "airline maintained custody of the luggage at all
t4
times."'' 13 Instead of focusing on the duration of the detainment,"
the Ninth Circuit looked at the passenger's possessory interest, concluding that his "only interest was that the airline, as his bailee, would
place his luggage on the next plane."' 1 5 Because the airline had not
relinquished custody of the luggage, and because the airline would
have still transported the luggage on the next plane if not for the
discovery of the drugs, 116 the Ninth Circuit ruled that there was no
104
Id. at 1033. The Seventh Circuit in Ward also noted that in United States v. LaFrance,
the First Circuit stated that a detention of a Federal Express package does not interfere
with the sender's possessory interest until the contractual deadline for delivery has passed.
See id. at 1029; United States v. LaFrance, 879 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[T]he only possessory interest at stake . . . was the contract-based expectancy that the package would be
delivered to the designated address by morning's end.").
105
See United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 704 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
2966 (2006).
106
884 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1989).
107
See id. at 1310-11.
Id. at 1311.
108
109
See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 704-05.
110 United States v. Johnson, 990 F.2d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir. 1993).
111
Id. at 1130.
112
Id.
"13
Id.at 1130-31.
114 Cf United States v. Brown, 884 F.2d 1309, 1311 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting "brief detention" of the luggage); United States v. Lovell, 849 F.2d 910, 916 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting
.momentary delay" due to removal).
115 Johnson, 990 F.2d at 1132.
116
See id. at 1132-33.
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interference with the passenger's possessory interest and therefore no
17
seizure had occurred.'
After reviewing other circuit cases and considering the Supreme
Court's approach, the Va Lerie majority focused on the following three
factors: interference with a traveler's freedom of movement,' 1 8 timely
delivery of the baggage or package, 1 9 and deprivation of custody.120
The majority then applied these three factors to the facts of the case.
First, the majority focused on the duration of the detainment and concluded that the "brief and temporary" bag removal neither delayed Va
2
Lerie's travel nor significantly affected his freedom of movement.' '
The majority also found that the removal did not affect the timely
delivery of the bag, 122 as it would have continued to travel with the bus
23
if not for the NSP officers' discovery of cocaine.
Addressing the final factor, deprivation of custody, the majority
stated that Va Lerie's possessory interest in his bag included an expectation that Greyhound or others at Greyhound's behest might remove
the bag from the bus. 124 The majority also reasoned that since Greyhound's policy dictated removal of the bag,1 2 5 the NSP's participation
in the removal "never deprived Greyhound of its custody of Va Lerie's
checked luggage."'126 Finding that there was neither delay in Va
Lerie's travel' 2 7 nor any significant interference with his freedom of
117
See id.at 1132 ("Because nothing that the officers did interfered with the [passenger]'s possessory interests in his luggage prior to the dog sniffing, there was no seizure of
the luggage.").
118 See United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 707 (8th Cir. 2005) ("First, did law
enforcement's detention of the checked luggage delay a passenger's travel or significantly
impact the passenger's freedom of movement?"), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2966 (2006).
1 19
See id. ("Second, did law enforcement's detention of the checked luggage delay its
timely delivery?").
120
See id. at 706-07 ("Third, did law enforcement's detention of the checked luggage
deprive the carrier of its custody of the checked luggage?"). The majority also noted that if
any of these three factors is satisfied, then a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred. See
id. at 707. Additionally, the majority stated that to "test the breadth of the carrier's custodial rights" a court should look to "the passenger's reasonable expectations for how the
passenger's luggage might be handled when in the carrier's custody." See id. at 707 n.7.
121
See id. at 708.
122
See id.
123
See id. ("No evidence suggests the luggage would not have been placed back on the
bus for transport to its destination ... .
124
See id.
125
See id.
126 Id. Though the majority found that the NSP never established custody, it did recognize the Jacobsen approach. See id. at 708, 709 n.9 ("Had the NSP exerted dominion and
control over Va Lerie's luggage such that it deprived Greyhound of its custody of the luggage, then a seizure would have occurred. This is what happened in Jacobsen."). The majority found no distinction between the NSP removing the luggage to present it to Va Lerie
inside the terminal and the NSP asking Va Lerie to come to the bus to consent to a search.
See id. at 708.
127
See id. at 708.
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movement, 128 that the timely delivery of the baggage had not been
affected, 129 and that Greyhound maintained custody of the bag even
when the NSP officers removed it from the bus, 130 the majority concluded that no seizure had occurred.' 3 ' After having established that
there was, in fact, no seizure, the majority held that Va Lerie had voluntarily consented to the search of his bag,13 2 and, as such, reversed
the lower court's decision and allowed the admission of the cocaine
133
into evidence.
This decision was, however, sharply criticized by Judge Steven M.
Colloton and four other dissenting Eighth Circuitjudges. 134 The dissent argued that the majority's decision conflicted with Jacobsen, the
lone Supreme Court case directly on point.135 It contended that Jacobsen should be the court's "guiding light,"' 36 and that it dictated finding a seizure in Va Lerie.13 7 The dissent based its conclusion on the
view that there was "no viable distinction" between Va Lerie and Jacobsen,'3 8 since in both cases, a defendant passenger checked a personal
article with a third-party common carrier, and government authorities
subsequently exerted dominion and control over that personal article
for their own purposes.' 3 9 The dissent also pointed out that under
the majority's three-factor teSt, 1 40 the government agents' detainment
of the package in Jacobsen would not be considered a seizure.' 4 ' First,
the dissent argued that because the Jacobsens had shipped the personal
article, rather than checking it with a common carrier, there could have
been no delay in their travel. 142 Second, it noted that any delay in the
delivery of the package was unlikely. 143 Finally, the dissent argued
that if the NSP officers' "physical possession and control of Va Lerie's
128
129
130

See id.
See id.
See id.

131 See id. at 703, 708. Unsurprisingly, the majority opinion, written by Judge Riley,
used the same language from his dissent in the panel decision. See United States v. Va
Lerie, 385 F.3d 1141, 1151 (8th Cir. 2004) (Riley,J., dissenting), rev'd en banc, 424 F.3d 694
(8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2966 (2006).
132
See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 709-10.
133 See id. at 710-11.
134
See id. at 711 (Colloton,J., dissenting).
135
See id. at 711-12.
136

Id. at 715.

137 See id. at 711 ("The critical question before us . . . is whether the luggage was
seized,' and Jacobsen dictates that the answer is yes.").
138

Id. at 712.

139 See id. at 712 (stating that the NSP investigators exerted dominion and control over
the bag "for the purpose of furthering their law enforcement investigation of potential
drug trafficking").
140
See id. at 706-07 (majority opinion).
141
See id. at 713 (CollotonJ., dissenting) ("Under the test applied by the court today,
the initial seizure in Jacobsen would not be a seizure.").
142
See id.
143
See id.
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luggage" failed to deprive Greyhound of its custody of the bag, then
such a conclusion was inconsistent with Jacobsen wherein the Supreme
Court found that the DEA had deprived Federal Express of its custody
of the Jacobsens' package.

144

The dissent also addressed the custody issue, concluding that if
the NSP officers did not exceed Va Lerie's reasonable expectations as
to the manner in which his luggage might have been handled, then
the DEA agents did not exceed the Jacobsens' reasonable expectations when they "merely replicated what Federal Express itself already
had done."' 45 The dissent concluded that both the DEA in Jacobsen
and the NSP officers in Va Lerie exceeded reasonable expectations and
"took 'custody' of the package and luggage, respectively, when they
took physical possession and control of the containers for the purpose
of investigating their contents.'

46

The dissent also criticized the majority's failure to follow the
court's own precedent on this issue. 147 It pointed to United States v.
Morones,1 48 United States v. Walker,149 and United States v. Demoss, 15 11
three recent cases in which the Eighth Circuit held that removing
packages from conveyor belts for canine sniffs constituted seizures
even though the brief detentions would not have delayed delivery.151
The dissent also pointed out that from the Jacobsen Court's analogy of
the field test to a dog sniff for drugs, 5 2 one could infer that the Court
1 53
viewed both as meaningful interferences with possessory interests.
The dissent concluded by pointing out that in Jacobsen, the Supreme
' 54
Court "did not regard the initial seizure . . . as a close question,"'
holding that the DEA's actions "'clearly constituted a seizure.' , 155 Following that logic, the dissent stated that "[a] bsent a revision of doctrine by the Supreme Court, the NSP investigators effected a 'seizure'
156
of Va Lerie's bag."

With those final words echoing against the backdrop of one major Supreme Court case and a muddled Eighth Circuit interpretation,
Id. at 713, 714 n.12.
Id. at 713-14.
146
Id. at 714 n.12. The dissent noted that the legal definition of custody would also
lead to the same conclusion. See id. (quoting the definition of "custody" in BLACK'S LAW
DICTrIONARY 390 (7th ed. 1999) as "'the care and control of a thing . .. for inspection,
preservation, or security").
147
See id. at 714.
148
355 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 2004).
149
324 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2003).
150
279 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 2002).
151
See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 714 (Colloton, J., dissenting).
152
See 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984).
153
See id. at 123-24; Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 714 (Colloton, J., dissenting).
154
Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 715 (Colloton, J., dissenting).
155
Id. (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120 n.18).
144

145

156

Id.
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Part III seeks to clarify the definition of a seizure of personal property
that is checked with a third party so that it both comports with Supreme Court jurisprudence and can be applied in a principled and
consistent manner.
III
ANALYSIS

The Va Lerie majority's misinterpretation of Jacobsen and creation
of a rule that conflicts with Supreme Court jurisprudence 15 7 both
highlight the need for a clearer seizure definition to properly protect
citizens' constitutional rights. Va Lerie failed to apply Jacobsenfaithfully
because the majority formulated a test focusing mostly on temporal
issues of detainment, while discounting the possessory interest individuals retain in their checked personal baggage, and approached the
custody issue in a manner that stretches credulity and is unworkable.
A.

Improper Description of the Possessory Interest Involved

Contrary to Jacobsen,158 the Va Lerie majority discounted the possessory interest implicated by the detainment of checked baggage by
viewing the interest as contractual, 59 thus leading it to unduly focus
on the duration of the detainment, and thereby raise the bar for
meaningful interference. In its opinion, the majority viewed the possessory interest in checked luggage as merely that of a bailor in his
relationship with a bailee, with the interest of the bailor being only an
expectation to regain possession in a timely manner.1 60 The second
part of the Va Lerie test reflects the majority's belief that the possessory
interest involved is minimal in that it simply asks if the detention of
the checked baggage delayed its timely delivery. 161 The majority also
implied that passengers have a greatly diminished possessory interest
in their baggage when the baggage is not within their immediate pos157 See supra Part II.
158
See infra Part III.A. 1.
159 See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 705 (approving the Ninth Circuit's rationale in Brown that
"'[the passenger] 's only interest was that the airline, as his bailee, would place his luggage
on the next plane'" (quoting United States v. Brown, 884 F.2d 1309, 1132 (9th Cir.
1989))); id. at 706 (noting that the Seventh Circuit in Ward would not find a seizure unless
an officer "'interfer[ed] with [the defendant]'s contractually-based expectation that he
would regain possession of the bag at a particular time'" (quoting United States v. Ward,
144 F.3d 1024, 1033 (7th Cir. 1998))); id. at 703 (discussing how the Fifth Circuit in Lovell
viewed the defendant's interest as his "'expectation that the carrier would transport the
bags to [defendant]'s destination for him to reclaim when he arrived'" (quoting United
States v. Lovell, 849 F.2d 910, 916 (5th Cir. 1988))).
160
See supra note 159.
161
See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 706 ("At minimum, the passenger's possessory interests in
his checked luggage entail the right (or at least the expectation) to. . . reclaim immediate
possession of the checked luggage at the passenger's or the luggage's destination.").
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session, 1 6 2 noting the distinction in Placebetween baggage that passengers carry themselves and baggage they check with a common
carrier. 6 -1 The majority's choice of attaching "minimum" significance
to passengers' possessory interests in their checked baggage is seemingly arbitrary and fails to consider the significant interests that pas164
sengers might retain in their personal belongings.
The majority incorrectly used the Place distinction to lessen the
possessory interest attached to checked baggage. A better interpretation is that the distinction only adds additional liberty interests to baggage in a passenger's immediate possession. 165 While it is true that
Place stands for the proposition that seizing a passenger's baggage
66
from his immediate possession implicates personal liberty interests,'1
which are absent in checked baggage cases, this analysis is unnecessarily superficial.' 67 Parsing the Court's language in Place, there is ample room to infer a relatively high baseline possessory interest
associated with a traveler's personal belongings, whether they remain
168
in his immediate possession or not.
A fair reading of Place renders this distinction as one that adds a
liberty interest to the case of belongings in a passenger's immediate
possession, but does not diminish the possessory interest a passenger
has in personal baggage, even if checked, at all times throughout his
journey. Therefore, the Place distinction as viewed by the majority in
Va Lerie not only leads to an unwarranted discounting of the possessory interest involved, it also fails to reflect the views of the Supreme
Court.

162 See id. ("To be certain, a passenger gives up his immediate possessory interest when
he checks his luggage with the commercial carrier as bailee."); id. at 706 n.6 (noting how
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits recognized the "critical difference" identified in Place between removing luggage from a passenger's immediate possession and removing luggage
checked with a common carrier").
163

See supra note 162.

164 Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 706-07. The majority does not explain why it attributes only
minimal rights to a passenger's possessory interest in his checked luggage.
165 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708 (1983) ("Particularly in the case of
detention of luggage within the traveler's immediate possession, the police conduct intrudes on both the suspect's possessoiy interest in his luggage as well as his liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary." (emphasis added)). The natural implication of this language is
that for cases in which the detention does not involve luggage in a traveler's immediate
possession, that is, checked luggage, police conduct may still intrude on such traveler's
possessory interest.
166
See id.
167 See id. This view in Place comports with the JacobsenCourt's description of the roots
of its property seizure jurisprudence. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 n.5
(1984) (stating that a seizure of property occurs when there is meaningful interference
with possessory interests).
168
See supra note 165.
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1. Jacobsen: A Clear Seizure
The Va Lerie majority ignored the significance of the Supreme
Court's finding in Jacobsen that a seizure had occurred when federal
agents detained a Federal Express package. In Jacobsen, the Court
found that because there was a "meaningful interference with a possessory interest,"1 69 a seizure had occurred when government agents
detained a Federal Express package while en route to its destination. 17 0 If a possessory interest was meaningfully interfered with when
the package, unaccompanied by its owner, was detained without endangering timely delivery, 17 1 then such possessory interest is at least as
great as a contractual expectation to reclaim possession of an item at
the end of its journey. 172 Further, if the Federal Express package case
was a clear one,' 73 the case is at least as clear when a passenger is
actually accompanying his personal belongings, even though they may
17 4
not be in the passenger's direct possession.
2.

Narrowing the Possessory Interest Involved

The Va Lerie majority's assertion that a traveler's possessory interest is greatly diminished when he checks his baggage, such that his
only expectation is to pick it up at the baggage terminal upon arrival,
misconstrues travelers' expectations as to how their personal belongings will be handled. The majority takes the basic fact that others
must handle checked baggage in order for it to arrive at its destination as implying that the possessory interest that attaches to such bag75
gage is the bare minimum expectation to reclaim possession.'
However, some modes of transportation, such as the bus, allow passengers to access their checked bags if necessary throughout the trip, indicating that there is more of a possessory interest than the majority
acknowledges. 176 Furthermore, when evaluating the possessory interest involved, one should consider the basic property principle that
one's ownership entails the right to exclude others.' 77 However, the
majority goes too far by treating a traveler's checking of his baggage as
169
170
171

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
See id. at 120.
See id.

173

See id.
See id. at 122 n.18.

174

See id.

172

175 See United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 706 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
2966 (2006).
176 While airline travel clearly does not allow for such access, others do, and the test in
Va Lerie would apply to detainments of checked baggage regardless of the mode of
transportation.
177

See BLACK'S LAw DICTrIONARY 1201 (8th ed. 2004) (defining possession as "the right

under which one may exercise control over something to the exclusion of all others; the
continuing exercise of a claim to the exclusive use of a material object").
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consent not only to necessary handling but also to possibly unreasona78
ble detainments by law enforcement.
This inappropriate narrowing of the interest involved is even
clearer when comparing the facts in Va Lerie and Jacobsen. The Va Lerie
majority found no seizure even though Va Lerie was on the same bus
as his bag, could access it at stops, and expected to reclaim possession. 179 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, found meaningful
interference with a possessory interest in Jacobsen,180 where the owners
did not accompany the package, and so could not access it, and did
not expect to regain possession of it.81 Put differently, the Va Lerie

majority would find Jacobsen to be an even weaker case for seizure,
despite the fact that the Supreme Court did not view the question as
close. 182
Additionally, the Va Lerie majority's approach goes against common sense and experience, as travelers would generally prefer to hold
onto their personal items throughout theirjourneys. 18 3 Although the
extra time involved with checking and retrieving baggage in addition
to the chance that it may not reach the traveler's destination might
partially explain the majority's conclusion of a lesser possessory interest in checked baggage, those factors also indicate travelers' general
184
desire to avoid relinquishing custody of their personal belongings.
It is reasonable to infer that many travelers would prefer not to check
their personal belongings, but rather are forced to do so by practical
concerns.

185

See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 707.
See id. at 708-09.
180
See 466 U.S. 109, 120 (1984).
181
See id. at 111-13.
182
See supra Part III.A.1.
183
But see Chuck McCutcheon, Air PassengersDevise Means to Minimize Luggage Hassles,
NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (2003), http://www.newhousenews.com/archive/mccutcheon
071003.html (observing that while there has been a trend among airline passengers to
check less luggage, many people now prefer to check luggage due to onerous carry-on
luggage security procedures).
184
One can point to the common complaint that checking luggage with an airline can
be a risky endeavor. See AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT, AVIATION CONSUMER PROTECTION
DIVISION, DOT 25 (2005), http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2005/November/
051latcr.pdf; DOT Aviation Consumer Protection Division, Tips on Avoiding Baggage
Problems, http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/publications/bagtips.htm (noting that although
"relatively few bags are damaged or lost," travelers should avoid putting valuables, critical
items and irreplaceable items in checked luggage).
185
It is logical to infer that most people would rather retain custody of all their belongings, or at least keep them in the immediate vicinity, but ate unable to do so due to obvious
space restraints. See, e.g., Travel Information Baggage Information, http://www.greyhound.com/travel-information/baggage.shtml (last visited Sept. 7, 2006) (discussing the
restrictions on carry-on and checked luggage); American Airlines, Carry-on Allowance,
http://www.aa.com/content/travelnformation/baggage/carryOnA]lowance.jhtm
(last
visited Sept. 7, 2006) (discussing limitations on what passengers can bring on planes).
178
179
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Thus, based on common sense as well as the Supreme Court's
holdings in both Place and Jacobsen, it is clear that travelers do, in fact,
retain a possessory interest in their personal belongings checked with
common carriers beyond mere repossession at their destinations.1 86
Moreover, the alternative-that the possessory interest that exists in
these situations is merely contractual-is completely unworkable.
3.

Unworkable Standard

The view that the possessory interest in checked baggage is
merely contractual, entailing only an expectation of timely repossession from a third party, allows the interest to be dismissed too easily.
By diminishing the possessory interest involved, the contractual view
allows government agents or common carriers to engage in undesirable conduct.
In practice, applying the narrow possessory interest recognized by
the Va Lerie majority would lead to strange results. For instance, it
seems inconceivable that when a traveler checks his bags with a thirdparty carrier, his only possessory interest in his bags is that when he
arrives at his destination, the bags are there. If an employee of the
common carrier rummaged through the traveler's bags out of sheer
curiosity or used the traveler's personal belongings as his own, one
would be hard pressed to say that such action did not violate the traveler's possessory interest, even though such activity may not affect the
timely delivery of the bags. 18 7 Nevertheless, because the test articulated by the Va Lerie majority describes the possessory interest so narrowly, such undesirable treatment would not interfere with the
traveler's possessory interest as long as his bags arrived at their destination on time. 188
Describing a traveler's possessory interest as simply a contractual
interest in having his baggage arrive on time also allows courts to engage in inappropriate hypothetical calculations that make it easier for
them to disregard the possessory interest.1 89 Whenever a bag is detained, the Va Lerie majority would first ask whether the bag would still
186 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 705 (1983) ("The intrusion on possessory interests occasioned by a seizure of
one's personal effects can vary both in its nature and extent.").
187 Because law enforcement would not be involved, this would not implicate the
Fourth Amendment, see U.S. CONsT. amend. IV, but the important point is that individuals
retain more than a mere contractual interest in their personal belongings checked with a
common carrier.
188
See United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 706-07 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126
S.Ct. 2966 (2006). Conversely, if a common carrier were late in its delivery, even with a
reasonable justification, this would automatically frustrate a traveler's expectation of timely
delivery and implicate his sole possessory interest as defined by the Va Lerie majority.
189 To find that timely delivery would not have been frustrated, a court might, for
example, look at the probability that a connecting flight would have taken off late, or
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have arrived on time assuming no intervening events, such as a positive dog sniff, that justified further detainment. 9 0° This analysis falls
short because it is far too easy to argue that Herculean efforts, however unrealistic, could have been employed to ensure that the bag
would have reached its destination on time. For example, even
though the Seventh Circuit in Ward found a seizure when the traveler's bag was removed from the bus and held for canine inspection
when the bus was scheduled for imminent departure,' 91 the Seventh
Circuit indicated that alternative and speedier methods of transporting the detained baggage to its destination on time could appropri92
ately be considered in the reasonableness analysis.'
In Ward, the Seventh Circuit essentially eviscerated the already
limited contractual possessory interest, thus demonstrating the consequences of defining the interest so narrowly in the first place. 19 3 The
Seventh Circuit first reluctantly found that a potential delay constituted a seizure, 94 but then went on to rule that the seizure was a reasonable violation of the traveler's possessory interest. 195 The Seventh
Circuit claimed that in the context of a two-day trip by bus, 196 a "relatively slow means of transport,"' 9 7 a delay of three hours and fifteen
minutes was reasonable. 9 8 The ease with which a court may dismiss a
passenger's "only interest" 199 is alarming and shows how simple it is to
maneuver around such a narrowly defined interest. 20 0 Furthermore,
when a law enforcement agent effects a seizure by detaining checked
baggage in a manner that threatens timely delivery, but subsequently
discovers nothing during the search, there is no incentive to deliver
the baggage in a timely manner since suppression of evidence is irrelevant as there is no crime alleged. However, even if the agent does find
enough evidence to detain or arrest the owner of the baggage, then
courts, as previously discussed, can still dismiss the timely delivery ismight
nect a
190
191

even assume that a helicopter would have been available to avoid traffic and recondetained bag with its original carrier, even though such a scenario is highly unlikely.
See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 706-07.
See United States v. Ward, 144 F.3d 1024, 1033 (7th Cir. 1998).
192
See id. at 1034 n.5 (considering methods for getting the bag to Indianapolis on time
despite the bus leaving without it).
193 See id. at 1034-35 (limiting the scope of the passenger's interest by focusing on the
length of the delay, not the nature of the intrusion); see also Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 705
(discussing Ward).
194 See Ward, 144 F.3d at 1034-35.
195 See id. at 1035.
196
See id.
197
198

Id.
See id.

199

United States v. Johnson, 990 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1993).
See United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 704 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.

200

2966 (2006). This kind of maneuvering directly contravenes the goal of reaching a seizure
jurisprudence that is principled and consistent in its application.
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sue through unlikely hypothetical calculations. As a result, the limited
possessory interest based on a contractual view greatly reduces incentives for law enforcement to both minimize inappropriate detainments as well as to ensure timely delivery of checked baggage.
B.

Defining the Possessory Interest Involved: A Realistic View
of Custody

A reading of Jacobsen indicates that the exact nature of the possessory interest retained in checked baggage is unclear. However, one
can infer from Jacobsen that the interest is the expectation that the
common carrier will treat personal belongings in a manner consistent
with the traveler's expectations. 20 1 This means that any handling
must be consistent with the purpose for which the common carrier
has been employed. Following this logic, the Jacobsen Court found
that Federal Express infringed upon the Jacobsens' possessory interest
when it failed to maintain custody and allowed the DEA agents to use
the package for their own purposes. 20 2 The Jacobsens used Federal
Express's services to move their package from its starting point to its
destination, and giving up custody to the DEA conflicted with this purpose. 20 3 When viewed in this way, the flaw in the Va Lerie majority's
seizure analysis becomes clear-its test relating to custody is
20 4
unrealistic.
1.

Dominion and Control

Rather than follow the Jacobsen Court's approach to custody,
which realistically looks at dominion and control, the majority in Va
Lerie defined custody in a manner that courts cannot consistently apply. 20 5 In Jacobsen, the Supreme Court viewed custody as a question of
dominion and control, finding that the DEA exerted dominion and
control when agents took possession of the Jacobsens' package. 20 6
Previous Eighth Circuit cases took a similar view, focusing on whether
law enforcement had exerted dominion and control over packages in
determining whether seizures had occurred. 20 7 The Va Lerie dissent
See 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.18 (1984).
See id. at 120 n.18.
203
See id. The Jacobsen Court noted that the DEA meaningfully interfered with the
Jacobsens' possessory interest, not only because the DFA agents took custody of the package, but also because they took custody for "their own purposes." Id. at 121 n.18.
204
See 424 F.3d at 706-07.
205
See id. at 703, 708 (laying out the standard); see also id. at 713 n.12, 713-14 (Colloton,J., dissenting) (discussing the incongruence between the majority's holding and the
Jacobsen decision).
206 See 466 U.S. at 120 n.18.
207 See United States v. Morones, 355 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding a seizure when
an officer removed a Federal Express package from the "mail stream"); United States v.
Walker, 324 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that bringing a package into another room
201

202
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similarly described custody as taking "possession and control" 2°s8 and
viewed law enforcement's actions in both Jacobsen and Va Lerie as tak209
ing possession and control for their own investigative purposes.
Under either the "dominion and control" or "possession and control"
standard, it is difficult to differentiate the actions of the DEA agents in
Jacobsen from the NSP officers' actions in Va Lerie.2 1 1 In Va Lerie, the
NSP officers themselves removed the bag from the luggage compartment and brought it inside, which by any fair analysis constitutes dominion and control. 21' However, the majority pointed to the policy of
removing bags to obtain owner consent to search, a policy that was
adopted by the NSP at Greyhound's prompting, as evidence that the
NSP officers removed the bag at the request of Greyhound, and argued
2 12
that therefore Greyhound retained custody of the bag.

Characterizing the bag's removal as something done only at the
request of Greyhound is disingenuous because such a characterization
ignores the fact that the NSP's desire to detain the bag was what drove
Greyhound's response in the first place. Greyhound did not initiate
the request that the bag be removed, but only reacted to the NSP's
request to detain it.21 3 Furthermore, the NSP officers removed the
bag without help from Greyhound employees, 21 4 driven by a desire to
detain and eventually search the bag. 2

5

Under a Jacobsen-like analysis,

it is clear that the NSP exerted dominion and control over the bag in
Va Lerie. However, the majority in Va Lerie, rather than follow its own
is sufficient to effect a seizure); United States v. Gomez, 312 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2002)
(finding a seizure when an officer removed a package from the conveyor belt for inspection and opted not to return it to the conveyor belt). But see United States v. Harvey, 961
F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that when an officer removed a passenger's bag from
the overhead compartment for the purpose of a dog sniff, no seizure had occurred because travel would not have been interrupted had the dog sniff not indicated contraband).
208
424 F.3d at 712 (Colloton, J., dissenting).
209

See id.

210

See id.

See id.
See id. at 709 n.9 (majority opinion). The dissent took issue with the majority's
reliance on Investigator Eberle's contention that Greyhound maintained custody of the
bag. See id. at 713 n.12 (Colloton, J., dissenting) ("The subjective belief or assertion of an
NSP investigator that Va Lerie's bag 'was not in our custody,' certainly is not dispositive."
(citation omitted)); see also United States v. Va Lerie, 385 F.3d 1141, 1146 (8th Cir. 2004)
(noting Investigator Eberle's contention that Greyhound retained custody of the bag),
rev'd en banc, 424 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2966 (2006).
213 From the majority's own description of the facts, it is clear that the NSP investigators removed the bag for their own purposes. See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 696-97.
214 See id. It is questionable whether involving a Greyhound representative would
make any difference in the analysis.
215 See id. While it is unclear whether doing so would have threatened a delay, the NSP
investigators could have waited until the bus moved out of the refueling area or reboarding
began to locate Va Lerie and then attempt to receive consent to remove the bag.
211

212
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precedent as well as Supreme Court jurisprudence, took a wholly dif2 16
ferent approach to the custody issue.
2.

Purpose

The majority in Va Lerie followed the approach in Ward, under
which custody is viewed as a question of "the passenger's reasonable
21 7
expectations for how the passenger's luggage might be handled."
Under this approach, any action that a passenger would reasonably
expect the common carrier to take, including requesting action from
others, is acceptable. 2 18 Therefore, if a passenger could reasonably
expect that Greyhound employees might remove baggage from the
bus from time to time, at refueling stops for example, or that other
passengers might move bags around, then law enforcement is permitted to do the same. 2 19 However, this approach is misleading because
it only examines how common carriers or other passengers may handle baggage without addressing the purpose of such handling.

216 See id. at 707 n.7.
217 Id. The majority did not explain why it avoided the Supreme Court approach.
While courts often consider expectations in the context of searches to determine if a
search violated an expectation of privacy, these expectations may also overlap into the
reasonable expectation analysis of the custody question. See Bond v. United States, 529
U.S. 334 (2000) (discussing the interaction between an expectation of privacy and Fourth
Amendment rights); Rudstein, supra note 32 (addressing "poofing" or "prepping" in relation to expectations of privacy).
218
See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 707 n.7; United States v. Ward, 144 F.3d 1024, 1032 (7th
Cir. 1998). If one does not view the NSP as removing the luggage at Greyhound's request,
then it is easy to conclude that Va Lerie had no reasonable expectation that people other
than Greyhound employees or passengers would be removing luggage from the lower
compartment.
219
See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 706-07 (noting that passengers should expect a fair amount
of handling, otherwise their checked luggage could not reach their destinations); Ward,
144 F.3d at 1032 (stating that there was "no reasonable expectation... that the bag would
not be touched, handled, or even removed from the bus"); United States v. Bronstein, 521
F.2d 459, 465 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, J., concurring) (stating that it is common knowledge that checked luggage will be handled by many people who "may feel it, weigh it...
and shake it"); see also United States v. McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320, 1326 (7th Cir. 1996)
("[T]he feeling and pressing of McDonald's bags that the police officers undertook in the
present case was nothing more than McDonald might expect from others, bus employees
as well as passengers on the bus, moving luggage to adjust, remove, or make room for their
baggage."); State v. Lancelotti, 595 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Neb. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that the
law enforcement officer's touching of the bag "went beyond the type of touch that a person could reasonably expect from another passenger"); John Flinn, Confessions of a OnceOnly Carry-On Guy, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 6, 1998, at T2 (discussing the trials and tribulations
of stuffing carry-on luggage into an overhead compartment, including having an airline
employee do much of the work and rearranging the bags of others).
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C.

Proper Seizure Definition

While "[m]ere handling" does not necessarily implicate Fourth
Amendment seizure concerns, 220 Jacobsen clearly stands for the proposition that such handling for law enforcement's own purposes constitutes a seizure. 22 1 Therefore, when analyzing the custody issue, the
purpose for which the law enforcement agents take custody is essential in determining if there is meaningful interference with a possessory interest. Passengers checking their baggage do not expect the
common carrier to move or sort the bags for just any purpose, but
instead expect the carrier's employees to move or sort them only as a
222
necessary incident to getting the bags where they need to go.
The idea that passengers expect the common carrier to handle
their baggage only in furtherance of getting the baggage to its destination is essential in understanding the relationship between the possessory interest and government detainment. After properly focusing on
the role that purpose plays in the seizure inquiry, it becomes clear that
if the handling occurs for an unexpected purpose, the custodial chain
is broken. 2 23 As a result, the Va Lerie majority's analysis of reasonable
expectations impermissibly broadened the purpose question that was
essential to the holding in Jacobsen. If law enforcement agents handle
checked baggage, thereby exerting dominion and control, and do so
for their own purposes, then there is a meaningful interference with
the traveler's possessory interest according to Jacobsen. By allowing a
reasonable expectation analysis to affect what the Supreme Court
treated in a more straightforward manner, 2 24 the Va Lerie majority's
approach to the definition of a seizure is likely to lead to results that
diverge from what Jacobsen dictates. As such, given that the Va Lerie
majority's seizure definition contradicts the only clear Supreme Court
precedent in this area, 225 such definition does not allow for principled
220 United States v. Terriques, 319 F.3d 1051, 1055 (8th Cir. 2003); see United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (stating that mere technical trespass is insufficient to constitute
a seizure).
221 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.18 (1984).
222
Cf Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 706 (noting that passengers should expect a fair amount of
handling, otherwise their checked luggage could not reach their destinations).
223

See United States v. Morones, 355 F.3d 1108, 1111 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that as

soon as the package was removed by law enforcement officers, a seizure had occurred,
without focusing on the fact that Federal Express employees could have removed the pack-

age themselves); United States v. Walker, 324 F.3d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that
a postal inspector's detention of the package is not part of the typical path of a package).
224 The Jacobsen Court did not struggle in concluding that the DEA agents took custody
of the bag. See 466 U.S. at 120 n.18.
225

See id. at 109. The fact that Jacobsen would have come out differently if the Court

had applied the Va Lerie majority's test indicates that the cases are in conflict; it is evident

that any differentiation is at best semantic or disingenuous. See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 712
(Colloton, J., dissenting).
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and consistent application and a clearer definition therefore is
required.
The correct test for defining a seizure would adhere closely to the
principles the Supreme Court set forth in Jacobsen and focus on
whether law enforcement agents exerted dominion and control over
the baggage for their own purposes. 226 Additionally, by looking at the
purpose for which custody changed hands, the test would not only
incorporate the Court's clear language and intent, 227 but also realistically examine how and to what end the passenger reasonably expected
228
that other individuals would handle his personal belongings.
Under Jacobsen, removing the bag and placing it inside the terminal would have constituted a seizure and Va Lerie would have come out
differently. 229 Va Lerie reasonably expected that Greyhound employees would maintain possession and control over the bag and handle it
in a manner consistent with the purpose for which Va Lerie employed
Greyhound: to transport the bag, on the same bus as Va Lerie, to his
destination. When the NSP officers removed Va Lerie's bag in an attempt to obtain consent to search it, they exerted dominion and control over it for their own purposes and effected a seizure under the
23 0
Fourth Amendment.
Closely following the Supreme Court's reasoning in Jacobsen allows for a consistent approach to seizures in the travel context without
compromising Americans' safety. Essentially, following Jacobsen
pushes detainments that might constitute seizures toward a reasonableness analysis, allowing courts to ensure that law enforcement is not
overreaching. 231 It is through this reasonableness analysis that courts
can properly weigh the interests of law enforcement and the safety of
other travelers against the right to be free from illegal government
intrusions. Indeed, this standard resulted in an acceptable result in
Jacobsen, as the Court found the seizure to be reasonable in light of the
overall circumstances surrounding it.232
226
227

See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120 n.18.
See id.
228
See supra Part III.B.
229
See Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 712 (Colloton, J., dissenting).
230
See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120 n.18. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit should have
affirmed the district court ruling and suppressed the evidence.
231
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (emphasizing the importance of
Fourth Amendment analysis even when "full-blown" detentions or "technical" arrests have
not occurred).
232
See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120-21 ("While the agents' assertion of dominion and control over the package and its contents did constitute a 'seizure,' that seizure was not unreasonable."). In analyzing the field test, the Court also noted the "suspicious nature" of the
package and that the "law enforcement interests justifying the procedure were substantial."
Id. at 125.
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Real World Application: TSA and Reasonableness

The application of a clearer standard that looks at dominion and
control in light of purpose and traveler expectations transfers readily
into the real world. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the federal government took control of aviation security, with Transportation Security Administration (TSA) workers now screening all
checked baggage. 2 33 While the various modes of transportation have
their own unique threats and security mechanisms to guard against
them, the Fourth Amendment does not cease to operate in the aviation context merely because of a perceived greater threat, even
though such perception does inform the seizure analysis. Unlike bus
or rail travelers who simply transfer custody to a common carrier, airline passengers are well aware that airline employees provide customer service, but TSA employees do the actual handling of their
bags. In fact, airline passengers have grown accustomed in many situations to checking their bags with the airline, only to then move the
bags themselves to the screening area and a TSA employee. Just as a
bus passenger expects a bus employee or fellow passenger to handle
his checked baggage in a reasonable manner and for reasonably expected purposes, so does an airline passenger expect TSA employees
to handle his baggage for limited purposes. Given TSA's visible presence and its responsibility for aviation security, airline passengers now
entertain reasonable expectations that TSA employees will screen
234
their baggage.
However, detainment of such checked baggage is different than a
superficial investigation of it in that a detainment halts the baggage's
natural path. As a result, TSA's own purposes for screening baggage
overtake those of the traveler who submitted to screening only as an
incident to getting his baggage on the plane. Once TSA's own purposes govern the handling of the baggage, TSA exerts dominion and
control over the baggage and effects a seizure. If TSA agents may detain checked baggage for any reason or for no reason at all, the
Fourth Amendment truly would cease to operate in the aviation context. However, this conclusion does not deem all TSA detentions unconstitutional, but merely requires that they have some reasonable
233 See Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.
597 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.A.); 49 U.S.C. § 44901 (2000);
TSA: What We Do, Baggage Screening, http://www.tsa.gov/what.we-do/screening/
schecked..baggage.shtm (last visited Sept. 14, 2006) ("[W]e have fielded sophisticated
technology solutions to screen all [passengers'] luggage ....").
234 See United States v. Va Lerie, No. 8:03-CR-23, 2003 WL 21956437, at *3 n.1 (D. Neb.
Aug. 14, 2003) (noting that "air travelers can no longer have a subjective expectation of
privacy in luggage or personal property" while "train or bus travelers can at least argue that
they have a subjective expectation of privacy"), rev'd en banc, 424 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2966 (2006).
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basis.2 3 5 Otherwise, TSA would act without any check at all. Still, it
would be difficult to show that a TSA seizure was unreasonable in light
of the thorough screening process, the unique vulnerabilities of air
travel as compared to other forms of travel, and the fact that terrorists
have already successfully targeted the U.S. aviation system. The TSA
detention situation serves as a good example of how a clearer seizure
standard provides a better framework for protecting civil liberties
without sacrificing security.
Toward a similar end, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
in exigent circumstances, the Fourth Amendment can bend to allow
law enforcement to intervene. 2 36 When a court finds a seizure, it may
be constitutional if at a minimum, the government authorities conducting the seizure had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of illicit activity at the

time. 23 7

Thus, while seizures

are generally

unreasonable unless supported by probable cause, 238 the real question in evaluating the constitutionality of a seizure is its reasonableness under the circumstances, taking into account all of the
competing interests involved. 239 The Supreme Court has recognized
that some limited intrusions through seizures of persons or property
are 'justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they
may be made on less than probable cause." 240 The Court's view here
235 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 136-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the requirement that a search or seizure have a reasonable basis, and cautioning against the use of
narrow definitions for searches and seizures).
236 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1980) (noting the importance
of exigent circumstances in determining whether full Fourth Amendment protections apply); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763 n.l (1979) (stating, in a case involving a
warrantless search for weapons, that there "may be cases in which the special exigencies of
the situation" would alter the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis).
237
See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981) ("[S]ome seizures admittedly
covered by the Fourth Amendment constitute such limited intrusions on the personal security of those detained and are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that
they may be made on less than probable cause, so long as police have an articulable basis
for suspecting criminal activity."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ("[I]n justifying the
particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion."); Investigation and Police Practices, 33 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 5, 19
(2004).
238 See Summers, 452 U.S. at 700 ("[E]very seizure having the essential attributes of a
formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause."); Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959) ("The requirement of probable cause has roots that are
deep in our history.").
239 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 ("[Tjhe central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment...
[is] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of
a citizen's personal security.").
240
Summers, 452 U.S. at 699. In United States v. Place, the Supreme Court noted:
We must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion. When the nature and extent of the
detention are minimally intrusive of the individual's Fourth Amendment
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is quite pragmatic, recognizing that in some cases "substantial" or
"special" law enforcement interests require a slight loosening in the
24
probable cause requirement to better serve the public interest. '
Therefore, it is a fair inference that substantial law enforcement interests are more likely to justify and to deem reasonable a seizure of personal property, especially when such a seizure does not affect a
person's liberty interests.
Even though the result would be the same whether a court decided that no seizure occurred or that a reasonable seizure occurred, the
appropriate way to balance the competing interests is to ensure that
questionable detainments are subject to a reasonableness analysis.
Therefore, the type of seizure analysis used is critically important in
situations in which an unreasonable detainment clearly occurred because a court could incorrectly determine that, in fact, no seizure took
place depending on which framework it applied, and, as such, could
permit otherwise unconstitutional conduct. 242 By ensuring that all

such seizures of personal property are subject to reasonableness scrutiny, courts will be better able to consider the various circumstances of
law enforcement agents' actions and reach a more appropriate balance between the interests of law enforcement in an increasingly dangerous environment and the principles of liberty protected by the
Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION

The Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures
protects American society's fundamental interest in ensuring that citizens will be free from governmental intrusions and abuses of power.
Though the Supreme Court has rarely addressed the issue of what
constitutes a seizure as it relates to personal belongings checked with
common carriers, it spoke clearly when the issue was before it.243
Consequently, Supreme Court jurisprudence is clear that when law
enforcement agents exert dominion and control over a traveler's
checked baggage for their own purposes, a seizure has occurred, and
244
such seizure must not be unreasonable.
interests, the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure
based on less than probable cause.
462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21; Investigation and Police Practices,supra
note 237.
241
Summers, 452 U.S. at 699-700.
242 This is the danger presented by the facts in Va Lerie. See 385 F.3d 1141, 1150 (8th
Cir. 2004) (Melloy, J., concurring) ("[T]he government expressly conceded that there was
no reasonable suspicion to remove Mr. Va Lerie's luggage."), rev'd en banc, 424 F.3d 694
(8th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S.Ct. 2966 (2006).
243 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.18.
244 See id.
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In Va Lerie, the Eighth Circuit redefined custody in a manner that
2 45
is unworkable and conflicts with the Supreme Court's approach.
The Va Lerie definition diminishes travelers' interests in their personal
belongings merely because they have checked them with a common
carrier. 246 Because it looks at possessory interests and custody in a
manner that lacks a clear and logical framework, the Va Lerie majority's seizure definition is likely to result in inconsistent application and
decisions that conflict with the Supreme Court's approach. Law enforcement actions that "clearly constitute [ ]" a seizure under Supreme
Court precedent 2 47 are nevertheless open to the wide discretion of
judges, 248 giving them more flexibility to avoid the reasonableness
2 49
analysis, a valuable safeguard of constitutional rights.
The U.S. transportation system is vast, unwieldy, and extremely
difficult to protect adequately, which is cause for concern in light of
the threat of terrorist attacks. While the tendency to narrow the
seizure definition in the current environment is somewhat understandable, it is undesirable when bedrock constitutional rights are at
stake, and especially when doing so contravenes clear Supreme Court
precedent. By calling a seizure a seizure, courts will protect citizens
against impermissible government intrusions while still allowing law
enforcement to ensure transportation security. An unworkable and
unprincipled approach to seizures impermissibly allows the bypassing
of the constitutional safety net that a reasonableness inquiry affords,
and as both the majority and dissent agree in Va Lerie, such an unpredictable approach is unacceptable in a democratic society.

See supra Part III.A.l.
See supra Part III.A.2.
247
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120 n.18.
248
See supra Part III.A.3.
249
Ironically, the Va Lerie majority showed the importance of this type of analysis in
weighing the interests involved by engaging in a sort of reasonableness analysis of travelers'
expectations when it concluded that no seizure had occurred. See 424 F.3d 694, 708 (8th
Cir. 2005) (establishing factors for courts to consider when confronted with seizure cases
that examine travelers' reasonable expectations), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2966 (2006). However, the majority bypassed the more comprehensive reasonableness analysis that would
otherwise apply if it had held that a seizure had, in fact, occurred.
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